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writing judicial biography is a deep-seated consciousness of
the difference between primary and secondary evidence.
American historians have, I believe, sometimes used news-
paper sources without a full consciousness of this distinc-
tion. Newspaper sources are usually secondary. They are
primary only when they contain an article by one's subject.
American newspapers have never had any facility in report-
ing litigation, such as is possessed by the London Times,
where the reports of trials are by trained barristers. Ameri-
can historians have often neglected the official reports of
the Court in favor of newspaper reports. Here the lawyer
has at least the advantage of familiarity.
Another great desideratum in a biographer is objectivity.
A lawyer is well acquainted with the difference between the
partisan approach and the objective approach. Although
partisanship is the practicing lawyer's traditional attitude,
he must strive to shed it in the preparation of a judicial
biography.
WHO Is THE "GREAT" APPELLATE JUDGE?
Willard Hurstt
One characteristic so marks most judicial biography-
good, bad, and indifferent-as to raise a question about its
meaning. This is the let-down that occurs when the biog-
rapher has brought his subject to the Bench. While he ex-
plores birth, family, education, practice, and politics, the
author usually seems to be enjoying himself. But in the
chapters that deal with the judicial years, a grim tone enters
the treatment; the author seems to feel that he has had his
fun, and now he must pay for it. And so with conscientious
plodding, he gives us the usual generalities about separation
of powers, due process, equal protection, and the rest.
So many judicial biographies bear this stamp that we
may interpret the fact as reflecting a remarkable lack of
definition of the problems posed by "judicial" biography.
Few books written about judicial years show much effort
to define what questions are worth asking about a man's
t B.A. 1932, Williams College; LL.B. 1935, Harvard University.
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. Research Fellow in United
States Supreme Court history, Harvard Law School, 1935-1936; law
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[Vol. 24
THE WRITING OF JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
judicial career, or provide much notion of how to go about
answering them.
We confront two main questions in appraising a judge:
(1) What is the nature of the judge's job? (2) In what
consists greatness, or quality, in the doing of it?
Let me suggest some possible criteria by which to
measure at least the appellate judge's job.' I do not advance
these dogmatically; certainly in the present state of inatten-
tron to the problem every man is entitled to make up his own
list.
It is part of our tradition that we think of public issues
in terms of law. Such a tradition puts to the front as an
important function of the judge that of educator and symbol-
maker. What has been the greatest impact of the Supreme
Court of the United States on our national life? Not, I will
venture, the results of its decisions; particularly, not the
consequences of its judgments in that much exaggerated
field-judicial review. Rather, in full perspective the Court's
main influence is its contribution to the main currents of
American ideas about government, about the rights and
duties of individuals and of men acting in association, and
about the standards of decency to be observed in the use
of government's power. Viewed in this light, the judge's
"style" takes on a significance far more than literary, and
both his ideas and his effectiveness in their articulation be-
come important data for the historian of ideas.
A second social function of the judge has been that of
planner of policies. It is a function of high importance in
any society, but particularly in ours, whose preoccupation
1. It is apparent that biographers have proceeded on the unspoken
assumption that the only judicial job worth attention is that of the
appellate judge. There is little or no outstanding work on trial judges;
the insight we have of this branch of judging we owe so far chiefly to
autobiography-for example, the two sensitive books by Judge Curtis
Bok.
Again, examination of judicial biography suggests a second un-
spoken premise: that only the work of the Supreme Court of the United
States deserves study. We have as yet little enough first-rate writing
on that Court; but of state appellate judges we have practically nothing.
Horton's Kent is an honorable exception; but the measure of our de-
ficiencies is the fact that we have no significant study of even so
towering a figure as Shaw. This lack of attention to the state ap-
pellate courts cannot be justified by their unimportance. For one thing,
we know so little about their functioning that to call them important
or unimportant is at present largely guesswork. For another, their
role in building a body of common law for the United States in the
years 1810-1880 is on the face of it enough to cast the burden of proof
on him who would deny their significance.
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with the exploitation of a continent allowed little patience
for the long view. Judges, it is true, have not often had
the opportunity to lay out policy on the grand scale. The
exception has been in some periods of constitutional decision;
here is one aspect in which we may properly assign im-
portance to the task of judicial review of the constitutionality
of legislation.2 But attention to the judge as planner will
bring us to appraisal of a more pervasive function, generally
neglected in judicial biography. Until the comparatively
recent overshadowing rise of the administrative process, we
have relied on judges as perhaps our primary experts in the
difficult business of relating particulars to generals, of giv-
ing life to vague standards of community policy through
skillful handling of detailed application. Especially in the
states, the legislature has tended to lack the tradition or
means for sustained follow-through, and this enhances the
function of the courts in the evolution of policy. In this light,
for example, the judge's approach to problems of statutory
interpretation takes on an importance rarely recognized in
judicial biography.
A third appellate court job which has generally had
little attention from the biographers is the administration of
the judicial system: What is the top court's contribution to
the morale and efficiency of the lower courts, and how does
it appraise the scope and limits of its responsibility in these
respects? Judicial self-restraint, vis-h-vis the legislature, has
become a trite subject; but there is little in the books about
the reviewing judge's ideas and practice concerning his proper
relation to the trial judge.
These are some aspects of the appellate court job that
the biographers have typically avoided. Likewise, judicial
biography has been surprisingly lacking in a feeling for his-
tory in its most elementary sense-that of time. To be an
appellate judge has not meant the same thing, functionally
considered, in all periods of our history. Take the striking
contrast between men like Shaw and Cardozo. Shaw is the
exemplar-Ryan of Wisconsin is another-of the great
19th century period of judicial lawmaking. Shaw's opinions
deal with public policy in broad strokes and speak with a
2. It is a reasonable hypothesis that John Marshall. for example,
by his imaginative and adroit development of commerce clause doctrine
contributed a good deal to the maintenance of a single free-trade area
in the nation.
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buoyant confidence natural to a time when judges were
masters of our law, and were fully conscious that they were.
Cardozo, on the other hand, speaks with a care for detail
and distinction, and a sensitivity to his proper limits as judi-
cial law-maker, that express a wholly different conception of
the judge's job. After two generations of eclipse, the leg-
islature, and then more lately the executive, had begun to
take the lead in policy. The 20th century appellate judge
is no longer a policy-maker of the first rank; proper ap-
praisal of his function must weigh values which had second-
ary importance in the 19th century.
So much for definition of the appellate judge's function.
These are at least significant aspects of his job. Now, in
what consists greatness in the doing of his job? What are,
the most important ways in which the appellate judge may
affect his times? Here is our central question, but despite
its importance it is almost unexplored. What makes a "great"
judge? You will search the books and-learned journals and
come up only with scraps of analysis of this question, the
answer to which should provide the whole framework for
judicial biography. There are certain names that recur in
essays and in the bar association after-dinner speeches. Some
years ago Roscoe Pound nominated ten or so state appellate
judges as the "greats" of the 19th century-Shaw, Doe,
Ruffin, Martin, and others. Those names turn up else-
where with suspicious frequency; there is the uneasy sus-
picion that all of the solemn judgments passed on our great
figures of the bench come back to that one list which Dean
Pound gave us. We have failed to develop a comprehensive,
explicit statement of a norm by which to weigh the quality
of the judge's work. By what criteria do we single out Shaw,
and the rest?
Integrity? Of course we want our judges to be honest
in the sense that they will not sell their decisions for personal
gain. This is, however, to define integrity in the most ele-
mentary terms. Even so, it poses problems that are unex-
plored. What sickness in our society can explain why a
senior judge of our most distinguished Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals, a man who one would think had all in authority,
honors, and security that a man could want, would sell his
vote to get money?
But we want a more subtle integrity in those whom we
10401 91]
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call great judges. We want the intellectual integrity that
makes a man conscious of his own limitations of imagination
and sympathy, aware of self-interest and prejudice. It is
dreadfully easy to be the Pharisee on the bench. We put
Holmes in our list of greats in large part because of the
value we put on his irreverence toward judicial pretense.
The problem of intellectual integrity is a peculiarly challeng-
ing one in the case of the judge, because typically he is called
on to assume the burdens of impartiality after a long train-
ing in being the partisan. The moral hazard of the lawyer
is that he will justify his means by his particular end. Here,
then, is a prime problem for the student of such a man as
Brandeis. As a practitioner, a feared opponent and valiant
champion, master of technique and not mastered by it, dar-
ing, adroit, sometimes ruthless in attack, yet holding to prin-
ciple: what in the practice of such a man must the biogra-
pher find to explain why the judge could cast off the partisan
robe so completely? Despite the challenge of the question,
which poses itself in almost every great judicial career, judi-
cial biography is typically most unsatisfactory in telling of a
man's practice.
We want our judges to be men of learning, and of wis-
dom. Pretty clearly, we are more concerned that they be
wise than that they be learned. Learned men may be small
men. Story was a learned man. He was also a rather pre-
tentious little man, and afraid of ideas and events. Marshall
was not a very learned man, but he had bold imagination and
courage of decision, and a vision of what an economically
unified nation could mean for men's living on this continent.
Still, we do want learning, in the sense of craftsman-
ship in the job; the wise man, like Marshall, will have that
even though he may not know so well as others the black-
letter. Judicial biographers show very little awareness of
the criteria of craftsmanship in the job. And, not surpris-
ingly, since they do not seem to know what to look for, they
do not see the evidence of it. Good craftsmanship in any
job, for one thing, involves economy of means, getting the
product with minimum waste and fuss. A judge's handling
of citations, for example, can be most revealing: the care
in selection, the precision in choice, the skill in building on
existing foundations.
Again, the choice of means reflects the master. A great
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deal of judicial history, for example, is wrapped up in the
techniques of statutory interpretation. It is no accident that
the 19th century digests and treatises are full of cases
enunciating abstract rules of statutory construction: "strict"
construction of this or that kind of law, "liberal" construc-
tion of one or the other. Twentieth century digests and
writings show less and less of such talk, and more and more
discussion of the use of committee hearings and reports, of
executive messages, and amendments and revisions.3 Finally,
let us note that craftsmanship shows itself nowhere more
surely than in the handling of facts. In the hands of a first-
rate judge the statement of the facts of a case seems almost
itself to declare the proper result. In his hands, the state-
ment of facts will reveal directions of thought and policy,
and light up the competing considerations among which choice
must be made. Of such matters can we make up a catalog
of the marks of good workmanship.
On what bases shall we weigh wisdom? Wisdom, that
is, for the judge. The judicial biographers tell us little of
their criteria of wisdom; indeed, they actually pass little
judgment on what would seem to be their ultimate problem.
I will make only two suggestions. The work of judges must
be subjected to two tests that apply sharply to all men who
have the responsibility of power. First, they will be measured
by their knowledge of what they are doing, by their sense
for the secondary and more remote consequences of their
decisions. For the judge, this means not only awareness of
the choices he makes, but also of their significance in the
life of his community. Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned that
judges need a touch of Mephistopheles. Second, the wisdom
of the great judge consists in a grasp both of the potentiali-
ties and the limitations of the kind of power that he wields.
For the Bench, this question which Dean Pound posed as
"the limits of effective legal action" presents peculiar diffi-
culties. For, as was suggested earlier, the greatest influence
of the courts has probably been exerted not along obvious
lines of power, but in ways subtly related to the currents of
3. The difference in approach reflects a different role of the judge.
The 19th century judge was not keenly conscious of obligations to the
legislative intent; he was riding high in the confidence of an era whenjudges were accustomed to the role of law-maker. The 20th centuryjudge is increasingly 'aware that he is in fact and not only in theory
merely a co-ordinate officer of government, and no longer the primary
policy maker. See discussion p. 397 supra.
1949]
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thought and emotion that move men to action, and to the
inertia which holds back what must be done.
Sensibility to such considerations is imperative for the
biographer who would acutely interpret a judicial career.
The lack of a conscious philosophy is apparent in most judi-
cial biography to date-the best as well as the worst. Judi-
cial biography has a job yet to do in forming and applying
adequate criteria, first as to the nature of the job, second,
as to the measure of greatness in the job. Discrimination
is the prerequisite of distinction. The "great" judge's im-
pact is felt on the law, on politics and on the history of
ideas. A definitive conception of the "great" judge is es-
sential if judicial biographers are to make significant and
durable contributions to legal literature. This is the inquiry
and the challenge.
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